Date: 2013-02-18
Reference number: OPUSeJ 201302181736TRB
Links: to published article http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=8532
to open-access PDF http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935776
to cover page: http://www.opusej.org/library/taxation-and-regulation-of-bonus-pay-cover/
Title: Taxation and regulation of bonus pay
Authors: Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak
Moderator: N/A
Overview: N/A
Addendum: none
Erratum: none
Bibliography: (alphabetical) N/A
References:
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[5] Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak, (2011): Ethical Finance, work in progress.
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[12] Garicano, Luis and R Lastra (2010): Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability, forthcoming in Journal of International Economic Law.
[13] Ghatak, Maitreesh and P. Pandey (2000): Contract Choice in Agriculture with Joint Moral Hazard in E¤ort and Risk”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.63, No.2.
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[15] Hakenes, Hendrik and Isabel Schnabel (2010), Bank Bonuses and Bailout Guarantees,unpublished typescript. 31
[16] Haldane, Andrew, (2010), The $100 Billion Question, Comments at the Institute of Risk and Regulation, Hong Kong available on Bank of England web site.
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[22] Radulescu, Doina, (2010): The E¤ects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare, CESifo Working Paper No. 3030.
[23] Thanassoulis, John (2011a): The Case for Intervening in Bankers Pay, University of Oxford Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 532.
[24] Thanassoulis, John (2011b): BankersPay Structure and Risk, University of Oxford Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 545.
[25] French, K.R., Martin N. Baily, John Y. Campbell, John H. Cochrane, Douglas W. Diamond, Darrell Duffie, Anil K. Kashyap, Frederic S. Mishkin, Raghuram G. Rajan, David S. Scharfstein, Robert J. Shiller, Hyun Song Shin, Matthew J. Slaughter, Jeremy C. Stein, Rene M. Stulz (2010): The Squam Lake Report, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[26] Tirole, Jean (2006): The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.3
Citation: Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak , 2011, “Taxation and regulation of bonus pay”, CEPR Industrial Organization and Public Policy Working Paper No. 8532 http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=8532
Academic citations forward:
1 Bijlsma, Michiel, Jan Boone, and Gijsbert Zwart. “Competition for traders and risk.” (2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013807
2 Feess, Eberhard, and Ansgar Wohlschlegel. “Mandatory Deferral of Banker Bonuses and Misallocation of Risky Projects.” (2012). http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/eea-esem/2012/547/MandatoryDeferral_Feb2012.pdf
3 Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. “Bonus Culture.” (2012). http://businessinnovation.berkeley.edu/williamsonseminar/benabou092712.pdf
4 Feess, Eberhard, and Ansgar Wohlschlegel. “Mandatory Deferral of Banker Compensation and Misallocation of Risky Projects.” Available at SSRN 2118560 (2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118560
5 Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking. No. 756. Institut d’Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, 2012. http://www.princeton.edu/~rbenabou/papers/Multitasking%20December.pdf
6 BESLEY, TIMOTHY, and MAITREESH GHATAK. “Bailouts and the Optimal Taxation of Bonus Pay.” (2013). http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/mghatak/bonustax1.pdf
Other citations forward:
1 Freeland, Chrystia, Feb 7, 2013, “Putting the magnifying glass on the 1 percent” Reuters New York. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/07/us-column-freeland-idUSBRE916114201302070207